Whereas economic grievance and the political opportunity structure could be the basis for understanding Ukrainian youth political participation and institutional trust, to date, no one has systematically applied the necessary contextual information to survey data to make this claim. To study these topics with survey data, we would need to match this context to the specifi c fi eldwork periods in which the survey data was collected. In this article, I match the economic and political situations of young adults in Ukraine with the fi eldwork periods of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2004 to 2012. This facilitates the use of ESS to test theories of grievance and political opportunity structure. I found that periods of economic grievance do not neatly align with trends in participation and trust. The possibility is open for the continual low participation and trust to be associated with the political opportunity structure provided predominantly by political parties during mass uprisings.
models in the context of youth political participation and trust in Ukraine. This is a mixed methods study. After presenting the contexts, I use ESS data to analyze trends in participation and trust of Ukrainian youth. I intend for this presentation of context and trends during fi eldwork periods to facilitate the use of ESS to test theories of grievance and political opportunity structure.
ESS Fieldwork Periods for Ukraine
Statistical analysis of surveys provides substantial basis for generalization, however, this data is limited for understanding specifi c events and processes. Apart from these general limitations, it is important to check methodological details thoroughly before performing of any statistical analysis as misuse of the data could lead to distorted research conclusions. Particularly, as I found in ESS, offi cial dates of survey waves could not correspond with the dates of fi eldwork periods in certain countries. In this regard, using ESS I locate the respondents' attitudes and behaviours within the fi eldwork period which, at times, differ from the offi cial date of the ESS survey. Everyday users of ESS data for Ukraine may not consider this issue enough to check if the offi cial date of the data matches when the data was reported. Thus, they may not understand the exact context in which the data were collected. I assume that the context of the fi eldwork is a primary infl uence of how the respondents will answer the survey questions. The dates of fi eldwork in Ukraine are presented in the Table 1 . 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Political participation can be defi ned as action by ordinary citizens directed toward infl uencing some political outcomes (Teorell et al. 2007 ). Teorell (2006) defi nes three different conceptions of political participation: infl uencing attempts that aim to insure equal protection of interests; direct decision making resulting in selfdevelopment and political discussion that results in subjective legitimacy. In this article I focus on the conception of infl uencing attempts in operationalization of political participation.
Political trust can be conceptualized as a general assessment by citizens of the extent to which actors and institutions within the political system behave according to citizens' expectations (Hooghe & Kern 2015) . Post-socialist states have the lowest levels of political trust (e.g. trust in country's parliament, trust in the legal system, trust in the police, trust in politicians) in Europe (Hooghe & Kern 2015) .
Youth Political Participation and Institutional Trust
To empirically analyze youth participation and trust using ESS data, quantitative scholars must defi ne this category with numbers. Defi ning the age interval for operationalization of "youth cohort" varies greatly from one research paper to another with three main approaches: generational, empirical, and sociocultural. Each depend on the methodology and purpose of research. According to a generational approach, researchers compare age cohorts who were born and socialised in different political and economic contexts. Foa and Munk (2016) defi ne the millennial generation as born in 1980 and compares them to their babyboomer parents who were born during the fi rst two decades after the Second World War. Researchers that analyze changes to the civic and political participation of young people also emphasize the generational aspect. Usually defi ned as under 30 years of age, young generation has many names: "Post-9/11 Generation", the "Millennials", or the "DotNets" (Fisher 2012) .
The empirical approach to defi ning age brackets depends on selected indicators of political participation. In research papers comparing age cohorts by voting behaviour, the lower end of the youth age bracket is 18 (McFarland & Thomas 2006 , Carpini 2000 , Hart & Hen 2017 . Research papers analysing youth activism and participation in voluntary organizations defi ne age brackets based on the average membership age of organizations under study (McFarland & Thomas 2006 , Smith 1999 , Quintellier 2008 . Longitudinal data present an opportunity to follow the respondent's trajectories from before 18 (Smith 1999) . The sociocultural approach is based on the idea that 'youth' is social construct and identifi cation of person as young depends on the specifi c context. This approach is more common for qualitative studies. For example, Rossi (2009) in his case study of ATTAC (Argentina), the Klampun Community of Papua New Guinea, and the World YWCA, and Fisher (2012) in her analysis of cases of Obama campaign 2012 election in US do not strictly defi ne age brackets of their respondents. Considering this discrepancy in operationalization of youth and the fact that I use different sources of data in this paper (survey data, statistical data, protest event data and secondary sources), there are some inconsistencies in age brackets according to methodological limitations.
Concept of political participation is operationalized through both institutionalized or conventional (electoral) and non-institutionalized or non-conventional (nonelectoral) forms of participation (Teorell et al 2007 , Marien et al 2010 , Hooghe, & Kern 2015 . In research on youth political participation conducted in US and Western Europe, there is a trend of young people rejecting electoral politics and disengaging from public life (Melo & Stockemer 2014; Delli Carpini 2000; Earl et al. 2017) . The literature classifi es explanations for this tendency into individual social background and structural factors. In the literature socio-economic background and family practices are defi ned as an independent factor of infl uence on youth political participation (Melo & Stockemer 2014) or mediating factor that infl uence on participation in voluntary organizations (McFarland & Thomas 2006) . From structural perspective, youth become less politically active and more vulnerable category of society in the context of neoliberal policies (Hart and Henn 2017) .
In literature, the youth have been portrayed as apathetic, distrustful and unsupportive of democratic institutions, and uninterested in public affairs (Albacete 2014) . Some argue that youth political participation is changing rather than declining. According to Earl et al. (2017) young people are politically active and involved in their own political socialization as evident when examining noninstitutionalized political participation, e.g. protest and other forms of participatory politics. According to Hart and Henn (2017) and Melo and Stockemer (2014) , while their older contemporaries have maintained engagement with formal politics, today's young are practicing alternative politics, or what Marien et al (2010) referred to as non-institutional participation. Individuals born between the late 1970s and early 1990s are signifi cantly more likely to engage in forms of direct action, such as demonstrations and petitions.
Grievance Theory
According to grievance theory, deprivation and grievances stimulate political participation and protest behavior particularly (Gamson 1968; Wilkes 2004) . In his casual model of strife, Gurr (1968) examined 114 polities and proposed a psychological variable of relative deprivation as the basic precondition for the phenomenon. Relative deprivation is defi ned by Gurr as "'actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifi ably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep)" (Gurr 1968 (Gurr : 1104 . He defi ned strife as "collective, nongovernmental attacks on persons or property that occur within the boundaries of an autonomous or colonial political unit" (Gurr 1968 (Gurr : 1107 . The more widespread and intense deprivation is among individuals in society, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form.
In his work Gurr (1968) differentiates between persistent and short-term deprivation. Persistent deprivation is operationalized through economic and political discrimination (limiting social group's access to higher economic value positions and opportunities to participate in political activities or to attain elite positions) as well as potential separatism, dependence on private foreign capital, religious cleavages and lack of educational opportunity (Gurr 1968 (Gurr : 1109 (Gurr -1110 ).
Short-term deprivation was measured through economic conditions such as short-term trends in trade value, infl ation, decline in GNP growth, and adverse economic conditions; and through political conditions, such as new restrictions on political participation and representation by the regime, new depriving policies (Gurr 1968 (Gurr : 1111 (Gurr -1112 . Scholars had further developed this theoretical model to emphasize that political and economic grievances of deprived individuals and groups are a main impetus for political mobilisation (Wilkes 2004) .
Since Gurr, grievance has been operationalized in different ways. Wilkes' (2004) study of First Nation protests in Canada, measured grievance through unemployment, which had a signifi cant infl uence on collective action. Dalton et al. (2010) with data from 1999-2002 wave of the World Values Survey, operationalised grievance through macro-economic factors (GDP per capita, changes in GDP, level of income inequality) and psychological factors (average life satisfaction, national happiness) (Dalton et al 2010: 64) . Ortiz et. al (2013) in their study of 843 protest events in 84 countries during 2006-2013 had defi ned four main dimensions of sources of grievance: economic justice/anti-austerity, failure of political representation and political systems, global justice and rights of people. According to Ortiz et al (2013) , economic justice and anti-austerity are the most numerous type of protests in observed period. Authors emphasise that the reason of their acceleration is the contraction of decent jobs as a result of the global crisis and expansion of austerity measures worldwide since 2010. Main categories of economic justice/anti-austerity protests are: reform of public services; pension reform; jobs, higher wages and labour conditions; tax/fi scal justice; inequality; low living standards; agrarian/land reform; fuel/energy prices; food prices and housing. According to the study, among the most important grievances of protests in Ukraine during this period there are protests against pension reform, protests against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and rights-based protests related to issue of ethnic justice (Ortiz et al 2013) .
Political Opportunity Structure (POS)
Political opportunity structure (POS) theory emphasizes that political opportunities is what facilitates grievances as a factor for mobilization. This theoretical model was developed within resource mobilization tradition, according to which deprivation and associated grievance are relatively constant (Wilkes 2004: 571) . As Mayer (2004) argues, the key recognition in the political opportunity perspective is that activists' prospects for advancing particular claims, mobilizing supporters, and affecting infl uence are context-dependent. Analysts appropriately direct much their attention to the world outside a social movement, on the premise that 'exogenous factors enhance or inhibit a social movement's prospects for mobilization; advancing particular claims rather than others; cultivating some alliance rather than others; employing particular political strategies and tactics rather than others, and affecting mainstream institutional politics and policy ' (Mayer 2004: 126) . A number of such factors of POS are defi ned in the literature: traditions and institutions; governmental structure; political stability and openness; public policies and government actions; political discourse; elite alignment (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996 : 1633 -1634 .
POS link change in protest activity to changes in the resources available to the group or to changes in political opportunities and national conditions (Wilkes 2004: 572) . In her study of citizen activism across 24 old and new democracies based on ISSP (2004 ) data, Vrabikova (2014 argued that in addition to resources, motivations and mobilization, institutional opportunities also facilitate individual participation in non-electoral politics. Citizen activism is expected to increase if opportunities for political participation are open and decrease if citizens believe the opportunities for infl uencing public decisions as closed. Specifi cally, Vrablikova (2014) emphasized decentralization of state institutions on the basis of the principle of checks and balances as key infl uence on individual non-electoral participation. According to her study, decentralization does so because it offers more access points to infl uence politics and increasing the opportunities for citizens to have an impact on decision-making. In addition, political opportunity structure also plays a second role through increasing the mobilizing effect of social networks on nonelectoral participation (Verbikova 2014: 2) .
Based on the literature on grievance and POS, there appears to be three main stages of increase in political participation for youth in Ukraine:
(1) Deprivation as disadvantaged status of the youth as a result of elites' economic and/or political decisions. (2) Grievance -feeling of anger and dissatisfaction as the result of deprivation in socio-economic and/or or political conditions. (3) Political mobilization -the process of building opportunity structure for political participation that could be grassroots and/or imposed from above (elites could use grievances for stimulation of youth protests in order to satisfy their own political interests). Thus, the literature suggests that political mobilization could not work without substantial feeling of grievance by deprived individuals or groups; at the same time, grievance could not be transformed into political action without provided political opportunity structure. In light of this, in this article I examine grievance and POS together and across time.
POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GRIEVANCE AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR UKRAINIAN YOUTH
In this section I focus on analysis of potential sources of grievance and political opportunity structure for youth political participation in Ukraine during [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . Analyzing sources of grievance, I consider the economic situation. Political opportunity structure is represented by larger political factors, such as the Orange revolution, party mobilization -interpreted as the actions that political parties take to get people to vote or to otherwise support party goals -and political corruption. Economics and politics are often connected -thus, in each I will occasionally present economic or political indicators, as appropriate.
Economic Context for Youth by ESS Fieldwork Periods
Based on the previous research (Gurr 1968; Wilkes 2004; Dalton et al 2010 Ortiz et al. 2013 , Solt 2015 , for the analysis of sources of grievance for Ukrainian youth I use macroeconomic indicators of GDP per capita growth (annual %), GINI index, overall level of unemployment (%), 25-29 years old unemployment (%) and higher education enrolment (ISCED 6 to 8). Considering that macroeconomic change could not be automatically transformed into deprivation and grievance, I further analyse economic situation in detail, describing economic context for each fi eldwork period of ESS. 
69
Ukrainian economy had experienced one of the world's largest economic downturns after the deployment of a new round of fi nancial and economic crisis in 2008. In 2009 Ukrainian GDP per capita growth had reached its critical negative point (-14.4%) ( Table 2 ). General level of unemployment had increased to 9.6% in 2009. Starting from 2009 the level of youth unemployment remained substantially higher than overall statistics and higher education enrolment had been declining since 2008 that potentially makes this category of society more perceptional to grievance. Data about higher education enrollment is calculated as total enrolment in higher education (ISCED 6 to 8) of the fi ve-year age group following on from secondary school leaving. A wave of 'illegal and covert privatisation of production facilities, research institutes, communal housing trade outlets and natural resources that developed on the eve of the 2004 presidential election and carried on right up to the fi nal round of voting followed' (Bojcun 2011) . Second, the processes of unregulated expansion of the exporting sectors became one of the reasons for the socio-political crisis in Ukraine at the end of 2004 and was the direct result of chronic ineffectiveness of the socio-economic strategy of sustainable development (Zhalilo 2009 ). Third, big enterprises avoided their tax obligations through corrupt agreements between fi rms and regional taxation authorities that lead to concentration of capital in certain 'oligarchic clans' connected with political elites (Bojcun 2011) . Finally, by October 2004, regional disparities in mean income had reached its critical point (700 hryvnias per month in Eastern regions and 400 hryvnias per month in Western regions) that could explain why more rural and urban workers from the Central and Western regions tended to support the Orange camp (Viktor Yushchenko), and the industrial workers of Eastern and Southern Ukraine supported the camp of Viktor Yanukovych during Orange revolution (Mykhnenko 2009 ). According to Bojcun (2016) , writing for the Commons Journal, [1] 'The mounting social and regional economic inequalities and an increasingly repressive regime were the triggers for the 2004 Orange Revolution'. By 2005 there was a decline in GDP per capita from 12.9 percent to 3.4 percent (Bojcun 2011 ). During 1990 -2005 , the number of students in Ukrainian universities had increased from 170 to 466 per 10 thousands of people (Oksamytna 2010, 166) . Also, during this time period, the number of higher educational institutions had increased from 891 to 966. Higher education was expanding predominantly through the emergence and development of the private sector. After the collapse of socialist block, 126 private universities were created (State Statistics Service of Ukraine). In addition to private universities, public ones had started to provide fee-based services. . What is more, in 2010 Ukrainian budget had experienced signifi cant defi cit -the share of expenses coverage by income was only 83% (95% in 2011) (Kravchuk 2015) .
ESS respondents also saw small decreases in unemployment. General level of unemployment had decreased to 8.8% in 2010 and to 8.6% in 2011. The level of youth unemployment reminded higher than average (9.9% in 2010 and 9.2% in 2011) and the category of 'unemployed after graduation from secondary and higher education institutions' had increased its share in general number of unemployed during those years to 16.2% in 2010 and 18.7% in 2011 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine).
During this period, youth in Ukraine saw fewer students and fewer universities than in the previous period. In 2010/2011 the number of students started to decrease, reaching 2.5 million of people and the number of universities had furtherly decreased to 854 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine). Government expenditure on education (% of government expenditure) had also decreased to 13.4% when government expenditures per tertiary student had decreased by 1% comparing to 2009 (World Bank Data). The level of unemployment had decreased to 8.1% in 2012 and 7.7% in 2013. Young people had remained more vulnerable category of society comparing to the average level of unemployment. For 25-29 age cohort the level of unemployment was 9.5% in 2012. In 2013 it had slightly decreased, but still reminded higher than the average level (8.7%) (State Statistics Service of Ukraine).
Students and universities decreased in number. In 2012-2013 the number of students had decreased to 2170.1 thousands of people and number of universities had decreased to 823 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine). Government expenditure on education (% of government expenditure) had remained stable when government expenditures per tertiary student (% of GDP per capita) had increased to 41.4% in 2012 and 43.8% in 2013 (World Bank Data). In 2012 new law on budget reallocation in higher education was implemented, according to which the number of funded places were decreased for social sciences, law and business and increased for computer science and technical fi elds (Orlova 2013, 13) .
Youth Political Opportunity Structure by ESS Fieldwork Periods
In this section I explore the political opportunity structure for youth political mobilization during ESS fi eldwork periods. I focus on the interests in protest mobilization of main political players and parties and their actions towards youth. What constitutes a political opportunity structure is not widely shared, though there are some commonalities across studies (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) . I focus somewhat narrowly on policies oriented on youth, youth political orientations, changes in the number of youth organizations, and specifi c events in youth activism.
I analyze the main protest events with participation of youth based on Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project organized by Center for Social and Labor Research. This project is a publicly available source of information about protest events in Ukraine. Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project database contain information about all protest events that have happened in Ukraine reported by Ukrainian web-media in 2010-2016, of which the research group selected more than 190 , regardless of their size and demands.
Among a number of indicators, the data includes the time (event start date, event end date, date of the week), place (oblast, region, location) and type of the events (preempt, rally, picket, search, negotiation, strike etc.), as well as information about participants (workers, pensioners, local authorities, citizens, teachers, students, small businesses etc.) and their demands (social-economic, ideological/ regional identity, political, civic rights. According to the website [https://cslr. org.ua/en/methodology/], the project was supported by National Endowment for Democracy and International Fund "Vidrodzhennya". Detailed information about methodology of Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project could be found in Ishchenko (2016) article.
In following sections I provide detailed description of political opportunity structure for youth mobilization for each ESS Ukraine fi eldwork period. Descriptions are based on available statistical data, local surveys and protest event data. These data have limits, as some indicators such as the number of Demonstrations started in the aftermath of the run-off vote of the 2004 presidential election that was eventually won by Viktor Yanukovych, the incumbent prime minister from the Party of Regions. As the result of political crises and mass protest events, the election was re-run in January 2005 and opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko was declared the President (Wilson 2009 ).
Both Orange forces (opposition political parties) and blue ones, which were for the Party of Regions, played a key role in the mobilization of youth protesters. Those under 30 years old were three times more likely to be politically engaged in Orange Revolution comparing to other age cohorts (Kuzio, 2006) . Qualitative research by Tereshchenko (2010) suggests that youth 'conceptualizations of, and emotional and practical responses to, the Orange Revolution were interlinked with regional differences' (Tereshchenko 2010: 99-100) . Young people from Western Ukraine were more engaged and active in oppositional protests of Orange Revolution comparing to youth from Eastern Ukraine that could be explained by regional disparities in voting preferences (Viktor Yushchenko had more support in the West, when Viktor Yanukovych in the East). Considering their youth-oriented policies, party declared in their offi cial program to support at least 75% budgeted places in higher educational institutions, a minimum-wage student stipend, a minimum 20% annual raise in educator salaries and universal Internet access. In labour policy, PoR declared to provide internships for students and support in fi nding the fi rst job.
[3] However, those social promises had more declarative character as none of them were fully implemented during PoR government that could be one of the reasons of further distrust in the party. In 2008 there were demonstrations (marches, protest assemblies and occupations) both for and against the idea of Ukraine being affi liated with NATO (Ortiz et al 2013) . The PoR, long building its youth wing, supported demonstrations against NATO with thousands of participants. Joining PoR was the Communist Party of Ukraine. At the same time, some smaller marches for affi liation with NATO with young participants took place in Western regions of Ukraine. Those marches supported by Our Ukraine and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, whose representatives (President Viktor Yushchenko, Premier-minister Yulia Tymoshenko and head of Parliament Areseniy Yatseniuk) initiated a joint statement on the possibility of Ukraine joining the NATO Membership Action Plan. In autumn 2009 also began strikes against wage arrears and layoffs, and there were protest marches organised by the trade unions against poverty (Bojcun 2011) . , 2004-2012 77 Politics: 2010 Politics: -2011 In this section I include the protest event data from the Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project that has data starting in 2009.
Viktoriia Muliavka,
ESS Ukraine "2010" was actually fi elded May 2011 to July 2011. There were several political events that could have had a distant infl uence on respondents' reports of their political participation and trust in institutions.
In January-February 2010 there were presidential elections in Ukraine. After the fi rst round, competition between two candidates -opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych and prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko -had ended with the victory of Yanukovych. In both election rounds, both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko won around 20 percent of the youth vote (Balakireva 2010) .
Compared with the election period, after the second round of the presidential election (February 2010), the number of protest events with student participants increased by nearly twice. The fi rst increase in the number of student protests was in March. The Spring surge of protest activity is associated with the beginning of a series of actions against the appointment of Dmytro Tabachnyk as Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine (Korchak 2011) . In the fall of 2010, student protests intensifi ed, and one of the most common themes of these protests was the introduction of paid services in educational institutions (Korchak 2011 ). This intensifi cation in student movement is not refl ected in ESS data collected in 2011 as it does not show any raise in young people's participation in demonstrations during that time.
In addition, in 2010 public protests against attempts of employers to reduce their expenditures and increase the standard of labour exploitation, non-payment of wages, violation of collective agreements and factory closures became widespread (Bojcun 2011) .
Politics: 2012-2013
Here, we should actually begin in October 2011, some months after ESS Ukraine "2010" fi eldwork was completed and before ESS Ukraine 2012, which was actually in Summer 2013.
In October 2011, some months after the fi eldwork of ESS in Ukraine was completed, there were series of student actions against 'anti-Ukrainian' position of Dmytro Tabachnyk in Kharkiv, Lugansk, Kyiv, Odesa and Khmelnitsky. One mass student protest was organised in October by students from Kyiv-Polytechnic University against what they argued was corrupt university rector elections (Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project database 2011).
At the same time, we can see activation of right-wing groups in dealing with youth problems. In October 2011 right-wing groups and organizations protested for provision of cheap apartments for young people in Kyiv and Khmelnitsky. In November 2011, in Ternopil the Youth Nationalist Congress held a theatrical performance on the same topic titled "Youth Housing for a freebie", when in Chernivtsi the police tried to prevent a nationalist organization's action held on the occasion of the Student's Day (Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project database 2011).
The 2012-2013 period could be characterised as radicalization of youth political participation from different ideological camps. For example, on January 20, 2012, people who presented themselves as a "youth wing" of the Party of Regions protested in Olexandria (Kropyvnytskyi Oblast). On January 29 in Kyiv, the police defended several hundred supporters of the all-Ukrainian union Svoboda (nationalist political party) from a few dozen anti-fascists and 27 young people who met the march of Svoboda with the slogans "Fascism will not pass!" were arrested in the city centre. The right wing continued its protest activities. In May 2012 two young men "armed" with forks, attacked a photo exhibition picturing the daily lives of LGBT families. In January 2013 two young people threw a smoke grenade into the room of the fi rst fl oor of the Sumy State University, where students from African countries attended in large numbers. Moreover, there was an attack on trade union activists after their rally against the exploitation of students and raids on student fi lm shows at universities (Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project database 2013).
A new project of law on higher education created by Dmytro Tabachnyk that was oriented on the expanding of paid services, produced a new wave of student protests in 2012-2013. Later, Dmytro Tabachnyk's project of law was replaced with one that was developed in dialogue with representatives of higher education institutions and the student movement (Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project database 2013).
In March 2012, a newly formed coalition of Svoboda, Front of Change, Fatherland and Udar political parties, along with local organizations, held a series of actions in the 14 regional centres and the city of Yenakievo directed against the incumbent president. The organizers of the protest named these actions, "Show the Red Card to Yanukovych". Despite that the campaign was announced in advance, and the unconditional relevance of social slogans, on average only 10-20 young right-wing people had participated in local protests.
In October Using ESS, I measure political participation through: voted last national election; contacted politician or government offi cial, worked in political party or action group, worked in another organization or association, worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker, signed petition, taken part in lawful public demonstration, boycotted certain products, non-electoral participation. For indicator of non-electoral participation all variables of political participation except voting were recoded as any type of non-electoral participation = 1, otherwise = 0.
Trust in Ukrainian political institutions is operationalised through the next indicators: trust in countries' parliament; trust in the legal system; trust in the police; trust in politicians; trust in political parties. (Table 2) . Such raise of non-electoral participation in 2005, particularly in taking part in lawful public demonstrations (28.4%) and displaying campaign badge or sticker (23.6%), is driven by Orange Revolution events in Ukraine during which youth were key social group participating in [2004] [2005] protests and political events (Kuzio, 2006) . The analyses in Table 3 suggest that the percentage of Ukrainian youth that voted last national elections is signifi cantly lower that percentage within older groups. This trend is stable across time. The rates of youth non-electoral participation are not higher than older age cohorts (Table 4) . Trust in parliament does not show substantial differences by age (Table 6) , with a small exception of young people's lower rates of trust in 2005. As with political participation, youth trust in Ukrainian institutions is tremendously low across time. The exception is 2005, when trust in parliament and legal system had reached almost 20% and trust in politicians and political parties had reached around 10% (Table 6 ). Such relatively positive evaluations of political institutions in 2005 are most probably connected with youth satisfaction with shirt-term outcomes of Orange Revolution events. However, youth trust in parliament is lower comparing to older age cohorts across time (Table 7) . Trust in international institutions (EU and UN) is noticeably higher than in Ukrainian ones. 
CONCLUSION
In this article I analysed the economic and political conditions of youth political participation and institutional trust in Ukraine in 2004-2013 and matched them to European Social Survey fi eldwork dates. The purpose was to better understand trends the potential sources of economic grievance and possibilities for building political opportunity structure. Since the theories of economic grievance and political opportunity structure are often examined using survey data, and since the context of the fi eldwork period should infl uence respondents' answers, I mapped these potential sources to the specifi c ESS fi eldwork periods.
The full test of grievance theory is beyond the scope of this paper, but the evidence suggests that the periods of macro-level grievance indicators do not align with trends in political participation. As Figure 1 shows, economic downturn in 2009 did not have any substantial infl uence on voting or non-electoral participation. General low level of youth political participation in Ukraine during post-socialist transformations is fairly expected in the context of neoliberal policies, from which youth suffered substantially in terms of access to labour market and students' living conditions. High rates of political participation in 2005 could be explained by macropolitical factors of mass protests mobilisation and building political opportunity structure during rotation of political elites in Orange Revolution. In the context of substantial economic grievance, such mass mobilization was driven rather by political parties in their struggles for taking power and their need in wider political support than by grassroots movements. For instance, despite of development of student movement in 2010-2013, supported predominantly by youth organisations, general level of youth non-electoral political participation did not reach even close level to 2005. On the contrary, it continued to decrease according to ESS data (Table 3) . It is not easy to clearly and elegantly connect the above sources of grievance with youth political participation in Ukraine during the periods of ESS fi eldworks. Some macro-economic indicators that had direct impact on youth were not immediately translated into strife. For instance, during 2008-2009 the level of youth unemployment was the highest after fi nancial crises and thus the youth had appeared to be at their most deprived. At the same time, in 2004 and 2013 macroeconomic indicators were not dramatically declining, while the high-profi le issues of failed domestic and international economic policies, corruption and uneven redistribution of income constituted a general context of substantial grievance which perhaps contributed to the mobilization of young protesters during the Orange Revolution and the events of Euromaidan. Party of Regions also wanted to fully subsidize employment of the disabled, orphans and single mothers and provide training to the unemployed for occupations with labour shortages.
